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Under the nation's labor relations statutes, a union certified as
bargaining agent for a group of employees is granted exclusive au-
thority to represent them in the negotiation and administration of
collective bargaining agreements.' In response to occasional abuse
I National Labor Relations Act § 9(a) [hereinafter cited as NLRA], 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1976); Railway Labor Act § 2 [hereinafter cited as RLA], 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976). Section
9(a) of the NLRA provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That
the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (emphasis added). A number of state labor relations statutes also provide
for exclusive representation in collective bargaining. See, e.g., MAss. GE. LAWS ANN. ch.
150A, § 5(a) (West 1971); MIcH. CoiP. LAWS § 423.211 (1978) (public employees); N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 705(a) (McKinney 1977).
Section 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976), also provides that the National Labor
Relations Board shall have the power to investigate employee petitions requesting represen-
tation for the purpose of collective bargaining. If the Board, after a hearing, finds that a
valid question concerning representation exists, an election by secret ballot is ordered and
conducted by Board officials. Id. § 159(c)(1) (1976). In the event that a union is victorious in
this election, it is certified by the Board as bargaining representative. Id. A labor organiza-
tion so certified enjoys an irrebutable presumption of continued majority support for a pe-
riod of 12 months. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976); see Pioneer Inn Assocs. v.
NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1978); Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d
945, 949 (10th Cir. 1977). The precise employee group to be represented by the union, the
"bargaining unit," is decided upon at the hearing conducted by the Board during its investi-
gation of the petition. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). Guidelines for determining an "appropriate
unit" developed through amendments to § 9(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976), to §
9(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1976), and through case law, see, e.g., NLRB v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1965); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 397
(1966); Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393-94 (1958). See generally, J. ABODEELY, THE
NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNrr (1971).
The employer's duty to bargain with the chosen representative encompasses most labor-
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of this broad power, the courts have developed a rule of law requir-
ing the union to represent all unit employees fairly: no individual
may be treated in an "arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith"
manner. 2 One area of union activity in which this duty of fair rep-
resentation has special relevance is the adjustment of employee
grievances.3 Where an employee claims that the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement have been breached, the labor con-
tract typically provides that the union and the employer are to pro-
cess the dispute through a series of informal conferences.4 Should
the claim remain unresolved after these preliminary steps, the last
stage of the contractual scheme is usually the union's submission of
management issues. See, e.g., Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-
91 (1965) (hours); NLRB v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 377 F.2d 964, 967-68 (8th Cir. 1967)
(wages); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949) (pensions and retirement age); Miller Brewing Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 831, 833 (1967),
enforced, 408 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1969) (work rules); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Since the
bargaining power of the union is exclusive, only the union may negotiate with the employer
on the terms and conditions of employment. For example, direct communication by the em-
ployer with individual employees may constitute an unfair labor practice if the employer is
seeking to persuade the individuals to break ranks with their union during contract negotia-
tions. See NLRB v. J.H. Bonck Co., 424 F.2d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 1970). Similarly, an em-
ployer may not bargain collectively or engage in grievance adjustment with a minority of the
unit employees if doing so would circumvent the authority of the majority union. Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Additional Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 62-70 (1975).
Moreover, notwithstanding that NLRA § 9(a) gives individuals the right to present their
grievances directly to the employer, this right ordinarily is sacrificed under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.
2 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967); see Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554, 564 (1976); Association of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971). See generally T. BOYCE, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE
NLRB, AND THE COURTS (1978); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REV.
601, 632-38 (1956); Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51
TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Theoretical Structure].
3 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1967); see Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U.S. 554, 568-69 (1976); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Theoretical Structure,
supra note 2, at 1160-74; Rabin, The Impact of the Duty of Fair Representation Upon Labor
Arbitration, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 851 (1978). In addition to the processing of grievances, the
duty of fair representation has been applied to a wide range of activities in the union-em-
ployee relationship. See Smith v. Hussman Refrigeration Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 2238, 2244 (8th
Cir. 1979); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW; UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
705-19 (1976).; Comment, Post-Vaca Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation:
Consolidating Bargaining Units, 19 VILL. L. REv. 885, 902-18 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Post-Vaca Standards].
' See F. BARToSic & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 193-94
(1977); R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 541-43 (1976); E. ELKOUm & E. ELKoum, How ARBITRA-
TION WORKS 7-9 (1973). The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics found as early as 1966
that 94% of collective bargaining agreements in major industries provided for arbitration of
grievances. Id. at 7. This movement towards the use of arbitration has continued to grow.
Id.; see W. BAER, THE LABOR ARBITRATION GUIDE 12-13 (1974).
19801 DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
the grievance to final, binding arbitration. Provided the process
was conducted fairly, the decision reached in the grievance proce-
dure is not judicially reviewable.5 If the union fails to render an
employee fair representation, however, either by not acting on his
claim or by inadequately representing him at a hearing, the result
reached through the grievance machinery may be disregarded in a
breach of contract action by the employee against his employer.'
, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562-63, 571 (1976); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); Holodnak v. Avco Corp.,
381 F. Supp. 191, 199 (D. Conn. 1974). In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), the Court traced the origins of the judicial deference given the
results of the arbitral process and attributed the development of this principle to the "fed-
eral policy of promoting industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining agree-
ment" and through arbitration of grievances. Id. at 577-78. An arbitral award thus will stand
undisturbed so long as it "drawi its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the parties. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960).
Notwithstanding the existence of a strong presumption that, because of his expertise
and broad discretion, the arbitrator correctly applied the provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, see id. at 597-99, there are limits to the extent of the courts' deference to
decisions of the arbitrator. For example, the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1976), sets forth certain irregularities, including fraud and partiality or corruption by the
arbitrator, which constitute grounds for vacating the award. Id. § 10. The arbitrator, more-
over, may not order a party to violate state law or public policy, see UAW Local 985 v. W.M.
Chance Co., 262 F. Supp. 114, 118 (E.D. Mich. 1966), although he does have considerable
freedom to fashion appropriate remedies, see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d
713, 729-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). Nor can the arbitrator exceed any
limitations placed upon his authority given by the labor contract. See Local 278, Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. Jetero Corp., 496 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1974); ILGWU v. Ashland Indus.,
Inc., 488 F.2d 641, 644 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974); Local 791, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Magnavox Co., 286 F.2d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 1961).
a Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 566-68 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 186-87 (1967). The individual's right to bring an action against his employer is
based upon § 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). In Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the Court held that, in addition to actions brought by the
union, § 301 authorizes federal court jurisdiction over suits by individual workers against
their employers to enforce the collective bargaining contract. Id. at 200. An action by an
employee is subject to the bar created by the results of the contractual grievance machinery,
however, and, like a plaintiff union, the employee-plaintiff must find a theory for avoiding
it. A finding that the duty of fair representation has been breached will defeat this obstacle.
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), the Court discussed this process
in depth. Reasoning that Congress intended to encourage grievance adjustment by arbitra-
tion, the Court reiterated that a fair hearing in the grievance process would bar the em-
ployee's breach of contract action. Where the employee successfully carries his burden of
proving that his union had not represented him fairly, the Court held that Congress did not
intend to prevent him from having his day in court on the contract .claim. Id. at 566; see
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). Clearly, where the employee has been unfairly repre-
sented and thus deprived of a hearing in the one forum to which he is limited, it would be
inequitable to refuse him access to the federal courts under § 301.
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The union, moreover, will be liable for that portion of the breach of
contract damages attributable to its failure to represent the em-
ployee fairly.7
Because the union must present the individual's grievance,
and because the employee often is blocked from alternative ave-
nues of redress,' the union's role in processing grievances will have
a decisive effect upon the fate of the claim. Thus, the duty of fair
representation plays an important role in insuring union accounta-
bility for egregious conduct in this process. Expanding the union's
obligation to include liability for negligent representation, however,
may present a serious threat to the future of grievance arbitration,
the preferred means of settling labor contract disputes If a union,
7 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187, 197-98 (1967). The liability of both the employer
and the union will be apportioned according to the damages caused by their respective
wrongful acts. Id. See generally Lindsey, Apportionment of Liability for Damages Between
Employer and Union in § 301 Actions Involving A Union's Breach of its Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation, 30 MERcER L. Rav. 661 (1979).
1 Restricted to the contractual grievance machinery for the resolution of workday griev-
ances such as vacation pay disputes or temporary work assignment controversies, the em-
ployee-grievant has no other means of remedying his claim against the company. See note 5
and accompanying text supra. Those employee rights secured by statute or by the Constitu-
tion are distinct, however, in that the employee may reach the goal of a fair hearing through
means other than arbitration. One example is the grievance of a discharged employee who
claims that he has been victimized for his union activism. Under NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to penalize an employee for exercis-
ing his right to engage in concerted worker action protected by NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976). The discharged employee may thus initiate unfair labor practice proceedings in addi-
tion to invoking arbitration, although it has been sometimes suggested that, in such a case,
the NLRB will defer to the findings of the arbitrator. See National Radio Co., 205 N.L.R.B.
1179, 1179-80 (1973); Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20
BUFFALO L. REV. 355, 357-60 (1971). Similarly, where an employee charges that he was dis-
criminated against on the bases of race or sex, the broad remedial provisions of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5-2000e-6 (1976), are available in addition
to arbitration based upon a contract clause prohibiting discrimination or requiring cause to
be shown for a discharge. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974).
Both the federal courts and Congress have displayed strong pro-arbitration sentiment.
See, e.g., Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S.
243, 250-55 (1977) (arbitration agreements construed to apply to disputes arising after termi-
nation of contract); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252-
55. (1970) (anti-injunction statutes do not prevent court from enjoining a strike where dis-
pute should be adjusted through arbitration); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543 (1964) (successor employer is subject to arbitration clause of his predecessor's labor
contract); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957) (Taft-Hartley §
301 may be used to enforce contractual promise to arbitrate); Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976); Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976). Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act states: "Fi-
nal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is . . . the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement." Id. § 173(d).
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
out of fear of breaching its duty through negligence, is discouraged
from abandoning meritless claims or foregoing questionable argu-
ments when claims are brought, the effect upon the institution of
labor arbitration could be devastating. Moreover, large awards of
compensatory damages against the union for negligence could serve
to impair its ability to provide the very representation mandated
by its legal duty. 10
This Note will trace the origins of the duty of fair representa-
tion and the standard used to determine whether a union has
breached it, culminating with the Supreme Court's landmark deci-
sion in Vaca v. Sipes." Later interpretations of the duty will be
analyzed with special attention given to the question whether the
standard has become so broad as to pose an unwarranted threat to
the stability of the arbitral system .12 An examination of the current
state of the duty, including specific examples of conduct that have
been held to create liability on the part of the union, also will be
provided. '3
DEVELOPMENT OF THE Vaca STANDARD
The idea that a union owes its constituents a duty of fair rep-
resentation was first articulated in response to incidents of racial
discrimination. 4 In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 5 the Su-
preme Court held that a railroad union had breached its duty by
negotiating an agreement that provided for gradual replacement of
black locomotive firemen by whites. 6 The Court determined that
the union's exclusive agency authority 7 implies a reciprocal duty to
represent all members of the unit "without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially, and in good faith." One of Congress' aims in
providing for exclusive representation and collective bargaining,
10 See Rabin, supra note 3, at 856; cf. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 99
S. Ct. 2121, 2127-28 (1979) (punitive damages for breach of duty improper; threatens
financial stability of unions).
" 386 U.S. 171 (1967); see notes 26-32 and accompanying text infra.
32 See notes 84-93 and accompanying text infra.
" See notes 94-120 and accompanying text infra.
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
" 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
"Id. at 204.
'7 The union derived its authority from § 2 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1976).
11 323 U.S. at 204.
1980]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:357
declared the Court, was to secure equal treatment and benefits for
all employees in a unit."9
The union's obligation of fair representation subsequently was
expanded to areas other than racial policy.2 For example, in
negotiating for a collective bargaining agreement, the union was
required "to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all
[employees] without hostility to any" because of the broad
ramifications that substantive contract terms have on the rights of
employees.2 ' Extension of the duty of fair representation to handling
of grievances was the logical next step.2 2 In 1957, the Supreme Court
"1 Id. at 199, 201. The Court determined that the employee benefits obtained by the
exclusive bargaining representative are to be conferred equally on all members of the unit
without regard to their union affiliation. Id. at 200-01. Analogizing the union's power under
the Act to that of Congress under the Constitution, the Court stated that the union had "at
least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the
Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for
whom it legislates." Id. at 202.
The Court also noted that the exclusive agency provisions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), similarly impose a duty to represent fairly the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit. 323 U.S. at 200, 202 n.3. This exstention of the fair repre-
sentation doctrine was suggested in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944),
and seemed to be implicit in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), where the
Court applied fair representation rules to an employee and union within NLRA jurisdiction.
It was not until Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam), however,
that the Supreme Court held that an NLRB-certified union could violate the duty of fair
representation.
21 See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44 (1957) (grievance arbitration); Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 336-39 (1953) (contract negotiation); NLRB v. Local 106,
Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 520 F.2d 693, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1975) (sex discrimination); Butler
v. Local 823, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 453-54 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 924 (1975) (compilation of seniority lists).
"I Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). In Ford Motor Co., the com-
pany and union agreed as part of their contract to give seniority credit for military service.
Id. at 331. The Court held that the union had not violated its duty to fairly represent the
non-veterans in the work force. Id. at 339-43.
21 The Steelworkers Trilogy of cases established the principle that arbitration clauses in
labor contracts presumptively cover all disputes arising under the agreement and that judi-
cial review of the results of the grievance process is available only in extremely limited cir-
cumstances. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960). This rule leaves many
unsuccessful grievants without any means of obtaining judicial review and undoubtedly
militated in favor of applying fair representation rules to the grievance process.
Another factor contributing to the application of the duty to grievance adjustment was
the ruling of the NLRB that certain instances of breach of duty in grievance situations vio-
late NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976), which prohibits a union from co-
ercing an employee in the exercise of his rights. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185
(1962); see Independent Metal Workers, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574-75 (1964). In view
of the special deference given to NLRB interpretations of the Labor Act, see International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 790
(1974), the Board's holding that fair representation rules were applicable to grievance ad-
justment carried great weight.
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held that an arbitrary refusal to pursue an employee grievance could
amount to a breach of duty.23 Clarifying the duty, the Court, in
Humphrey v. Moore,24 found that where the union considers the
merits of a grievance and decides not to prosecute, its decision
should not be disturbed if reached "honestly, in good faith and
without hostility or arbitrary discrimination.
25
Further elaborating on the requirements for establishing a
breach of the duty of fair representation, the Court decided the
landmark case of Vaca v. Sipes2 in 1967. Vaca involved a medical
discharge of an employee who claimed he was fit for work. After
considering conflicting medical opinions from different physicians,
processing the claim unsuccessfully through several steps of the
contractual grievance procedure, and reaching a compromise with
the company that was rejected by the grievant, the union decided
not to arbitrate the grievance.? The employee then brought a
damage action against the union for his wrongful discharge, claiming
that the union had breached its duty of fair representation by fail-
ing to arbitrate his claim.2
The employee allegedly aggrieved by a breach of duty may invoke NLRB unfair labor
practice proceedings against his union under Miranda Fuel or commence an action under §
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976); see note 6 and accompanying text
supra. See Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1970). Although the Miranda Fuel ruling
did not survive a judicial enforcement action, see 326 F.2d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 1963), the deci-
sion nevertheless will control in any proceeding brought before the Board. See Independent
Metal Workers, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574-75 (1964); R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 700.
The overwhelming majority of fair representation plaintiffs have chosen the judicial forum.
See Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's
Duty of Fair Representation, 5 UNIv. oF TOL. L. Rav. 514 (1974). This is perhaps attributable
to such factors as the convenience of joining both defendants in a single action and the
possibility of a jury trial.
" Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957).
24 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
"' Id. at 350. In Humphrey, plaintiffs objected to the decision of a Joint Conference
Committee to dovetail the seniority lists of two companies after the sale of one firm's busi-
ness to the other, but the union declined to proceed on their behalf. "Dovetailing" is the
combining of seniority lists without regard to the place of employment. "Endtailing," on
the other hand, is the compiling of seniority lists by placing employees of the absorbed
firm on the bottom. Dovetailing arrangements frequently give rise to breach of duty claims
by employees desiring endtailing, and vice versa. See Post-Vaca Standards, supra note 3,
at 906-07. The Humphrey Court scrutinized the manner in which the union policy was
formulated and allowed it to stand, noting that if the union were held liable merely for
resolving workplace issues in favor of certain employees in good faith, union decisionmaking
would be paralyzed. 375 U.S. at 249-50. But see Smith v. Hussman Refrig. Co., 100
L.R.R.M. 2238, 2245 (8th Cir. 1979).
-386 U.S. 171 (1967).
386 U.S. at 174-76.
" Id. at 173. The plaintiff apparently did not seek redress against the company.
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Finding that an employee does not have an absolute right to
have his claim arbitrated, the Court held that the union's mere
refusal to arbitrate a meritorious grievance did not constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation.29 The Vaca Court declared
that a breach of the duty "occurs only when a union's conduct
toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith."3 In applying these standards to
union conduct in the grievance process, the Court enunciated the
rule that "a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance
or process it in a perfunctory fashion."'3' Although it found no breach
of duty on the facts presented, 32 the Vaca Court unfortunately
offered little guidance concerning the meaning of these standards,
thus leaving it to the lower courts to fix the precise parameters of the
union's obligation.
THE Vaca STANDARD AND UNION CONDUCT OF GRIEVANCES
While Vaca is recognized universally as the preeminent exposi-
tion of the proper standard for judging union handling of employee
grievances, 33 the courts often differ on its proper interpretation.
The exact types of union conduct that may result in union liability
and in voiding the outcome of the grievance process remain
unclear.
Id. at 191-92; accord, Stanley v. General Foods Corp., 508 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644, 648 (10th Cir. 1973).
The Vaca Court first disposed of a then serious jurisdictional issue, holding that the
federal and state courts have jurisdiction over suits based on a breach of the duty of fair
representation. The Court rejected the argument that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction.
386 U.S. at 176-88.
Addressing the argument that the union has an absolute duty to take employee griev-
ances to arbitration, see Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation under Taft-Hartley, 30
Mo. L. Rev. 373, 389 (1965); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Ar-
bitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. RE v. 362, 402 (1962), the Court first noted that the congressional
determination that the contractual grievance machinery is the preferred method of labor
dispute settlement contemplated a corollary good faith effort to settle short of a full arbitra-
tion hearing. 386 U.S. at 191. The Court then opined that to enable every employee to com-
pel full arbitration of any claim would overburden the grievance process and make it exceed-
ingly costly. Id. at 192. Moreover, the employer would be forced to deal increasingly with the
individual, signalling a return "to the vagaries of independent and unsystematic negotia-
tion." Id. at 191.
30 386 U.S. at 190 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953)).
Id. at 191.
32 Id. at 192-93.
• See Rabin, supra note 3, at 854; Post-Vaca Standards, supra note 3, at 885; Baer,
Labor Relations: Fair Representation, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1979, at 1, col. 1, 28, col. 2.
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"Bad Faith" and "Discrimination"
The bad faith and discrimination bases of liability have been
invoked only to remedy the most egregipus union conduct. Findings
of bad faith generally have been limited to situations in which the
union has made affirmative misrepresentations to, or has actively
concealed information from, the individual34 and, in so-doi-g,-_has
interferaedin-a concrete manner with the chances of suc- sfuly-
resolving the grievance.35 The discrimination basis of liabilit1y--as
played a significant role in the prevention of unfair union conduct
toward racial minorities,36 women," non-union members," and
others who may require protection from the power of the majority.39
Discrimination findings, however, have not been as common in the
grievance area as they have been in other areas of union activity.
One contributing factor may be the rule that proof of mere dispa-
rate treatment of similarly placed grievants does not establish ac-
tionable discrimination by the union." While recent decisions may
31 In Robinson v. Marsh Plating Corp., 443 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Mich. 1978), the union
first represented to the plaintiff employee that his grievance was being pursued when in fact
it had been abandoned. Later, the union informed the plaintiff that the bargaining commit-
tee had unanimously decided to drop his grievance, but at least one member was prepared to
testify that he had never been polled. Accordingly, the court denied a motion to dismiss the
breach of duty action. Id. at 815. But cf. Marietta v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 414 F. Supp.
1029 (D.N.J. 1976) (union did not act in bad faith by taking the grievance through several
steps without consulting the grievant).
The reason for the relative dearth of cases centering explicitly on the "bad faith" theory
may be that it is easier for a plaintiff to challenge union action on the grounds that it is not
rationally explainable and thus "arbitrary." Where the employee claims that his case has
been singled out for unfair treatment for a particular reason, however, "arbitrariness" is
technically an improper theory. Under the traditional interpretation, arbitrary conduct is
that which is engaged in without reason. See note 43 infra.
15 In order for a plaintiff to establish union liability on the basis of bad faith, a causal
relationship between the union's misrepresentation or concealment and the failure of the
grievance must be s'hown. See Besedich v. Missile & Space Div. of LTV Aerospace Corp.,
433 F. Supp. 954, 958-59 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Siskey v. General Teamsters Local 261, 419 F.
Supp. 48, 53 (W.D. Pa. 1976). See generally Walden v. Local 71, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 468
F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1972).
18 See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 773-74 (1952); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
3' See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 520 F.2d 693, 697 (6th Cir.
1975); Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 1972); Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, 209 N.L.R.B. 519, 526 (1974).
u See, e.g., Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191, 199 (4th
Cir. 1963); Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 1254, 1258-59 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
"' See, e.g., NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635, 637
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974) (discrimination against Mexican nationals).
'1 See Turner v. Air Transport Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1972).
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indicate a liberalization of bad faith and discrimination stan-
dards,4' perhaps the greatest importance of the bad faith and dis-
crimination bases is that their conservative application makes the
proper scope of the concept of arbitrariness an issue of paramount
significance.
"Arbitrariness" - The Early View
One apparent effect of Vaca's addition of arbitrariness as a
possible means of breaching the duty is that the employee need
not show evidence of common-law malice or a particular hostile
motive on the part of the union. 42 Indeed, arbitrariness exists where
there is no reason for a party's conduct." Since processing griev-
ances is one of the union's most significant and demanding respon-
sibilities,4  there is considerable support for the requirement that
the union have a legitimate explanation for each of its actions
in the area. 5  There is substantial controversy, however,
whether a union must act intentionally against the grievant's inter-
A classic form of discrimination would seem to occur where the union representation of
union members surpasses representation of nonmembers. See Thompson v. Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191, 199 (4th Cir. 1963); Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
465 F. Supp. 1254, 1258-59 (S.D. Fla. 1979). In the Turner case, however, the court held that
where an employer had treated the grievances of union members more favorably than those
of nonmembers and had refused to press the grievance of the plaintiff nonmember, the union
had not violated its duty. 468 F.2d at 300-01.
1' The seventh circuit's decision in Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 585 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir. 1978), may promote the use of the discrimination theory. In Archie, the union's duty
was held to have been breached when it settled a black employee's grievance by having him
sign an extremely strict agreement with management guaranteeing that he would carry out
his duties in an error-free manner. Id. at 213. No white employee had ever been subject to
such an arrangement under similar circumstances. Id. at 220. The court expressly narrowed
its decision strictly to a discrimination theory, noting that a finding of bad faith was not
essential to maintenance of the action and was not the theory underlying the decision. Id. at
219.
42 See Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union, 590 F.2d 451, 455 (2d
Cir. 1979); Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974). Vaca has
been viewed by the courts as an intentional enlargement of the area of union liability. Ber-
iault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers, 501 F.2d 258, 264 (9th Cir. 1974). Griffin v.
UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972); Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel and Elevator
Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018, 1023 n.8 (9th Cir. 1972).
11 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (4th rev. ed. 1968) defines the term "arbitrary" as "without
adequate determining principle; ...not done or acting according to reason or judgment."
Id. at 134. "Arbitrariness" is defined as "[c]onduct or acts based alone upon one's will, and
not upon any course of reasoning and exercise of judgment." Id.
" See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960);
National Airlines, Inc. v. IAM, 478 F.2d 1062, 1063 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973); Price v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 457 F.2d 605, 609 (3d Cir. 1972).
,1 See Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972); GORMAN, supra note 3, at 714.
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est in order to breach its duty, or whether negligent conduct may
suffice to constitute a violation of the obligation."5
It might be imagined that the liberalized Vaca standard would
have opened the door to a marked increase in judicial regulation of
union activity in the grievance process. Until quite recently, how-
ever, most courts were reluctant to use arbitrariness as an indepen-
dent ground for finding a breach of duty.47 In most early cases
where plaintiffs urged an expansive reading of Vaca, its standard
was interpreted narrowly as an absence of reasoned decisionmaking
so egregious that hostility to the grievant or his claim could be
inferred."
An example of this view of Vaca is the decision of the third
circuit in Bazarte v. United Transportation Union,4" wherein the
plaintiff was discharged, after a hearing, for absence without per-
mission. Faced with unfavorable evidence and proof that the plain-
tiff had violated other company rules, a union representative de-
cided not to pursue the matter further." The court held that even if
the union had acted "negligently or exercised poor judgment," a
claim of "arbitrary conduct" was not established, since a good
faith effort to obtain the plaintiff's reinstatement had been made."
These cases evince a tendency to focus on whether the union
had intentionally inflicted harm on the individual's chances for re-
dress. Considerable authority for such a requirement of conscious
harm can be found in the Supreme Court's decision in Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge.2 In Lockridge, the Court stated
that to establish arbitrariness or bad faith, a breach of duty claim-
ant must produce " 'substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action
or dishonest conduct.' "5 The duty was developed, according to the
' Post-Vaca Standards, supra note 3, at 888-90; Baer, supra note 33, at 28, col. 3.
,7 For examples of cases that refused to invoke arbitrariness as a separate ground for
finding a breach, see Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 952 (1971); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970);
Whitmore v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 383 F. Supp. 46, 49 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
One explanation suggested for the apparent judicial reluctance to use arbitrariness as a
grounds for establishing breach of duty may be that the substantive law on the duty of fair
representation has consistently been "weighted heavily in favor of the labor-management
establishment and against the individual employee." See Tobias, supra note 22, at 523.
" See Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952
(1971); Balowski v. UAW, 372 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1967).
49 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 870.
5' Id. at 872.
52 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
13 Id. at 299 (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)).
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Lockridge Court, to forbid "intentional, severe" discrimination and
to prevent "invidious, hostile treatment" of workers by their
unions.54
This limited construction of the Vaca standard does not im-
pose breach of duty liability where only negligence is shown; it re-
quires proof that the union consciously used its exclusive agency
capacity to work against the individual employee's interests.15 It is
submitted that the Vaca Court intended such an interpretation. In
Vaca, the Court recognized that the union is entitled to exercise
broad discretion in its handling of grievances and that the union is
the best judge of how to use its own finite resources of time and
funds to prosecute employee claims. 6 Given this recognition, it
does not seem that the Court meant to authorize a finding of
breach of duty where the union makes an error of judgment, even
an unreasoned one, without any intent to harm the interests it is
charged with protecting. 7 In ruling that the union could breach its
duty by "arbitrary" conduct, it is suggested that the Vaca Court
meant to impose liability for activity that had no identifiable mo-
tive, as opposed to a discriminatory or bad faith motive, but is nev-
1, 403 U.S. at 301.
15 See Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975); Dente v.
Masters Local 90, 492 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974); Reid v.
UAW Dist. Lodge 1093, 479 F.2d 517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973). The
requirement of intentional harm, however, is entirely separate from the issue whether the
harmful act is done without reason and thus is "arbitrary." In the normal course of events,
for example, a union could consciously decide to abandon a grievance, thus intentionally
harming the grievant's chances for relief, but still not be guilty of breach of duty if its inflic-
tion of this harm is supported by a rational consideration of policy or of convenience. See
notes 100-103 and accompanying text infra.
" 386 U.S. at 191-92.
", The Court's two major post-Lockridge pronouncements on the duty of fair representa-
tion deal only in passing with the issue of the proper standard for liability, but are neverthe-
less susceptible to the interpretation that only intentional conduct can breach the duty. In
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), the Court held that a breach of
duty finding removes the bar to an employee's breach of contract suit against his employer. Id.
at 567 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)); see note 21 supra. The
Court defined the duty as the union's obligation of "complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of its discretion." 424 U.S. at 564. No mention was made of a due care
requirement.
In International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), the Court ruled
punitive damages improper in fair representation actions. The majority's remarks on a
union's standard of conduct were confined largely to quotations from Vaca and other leading
cases. Id. at 46-48. It is suggested, however, that the Court's reasoning on the propriety of
punitive damages is relevant to the standard of conduct question. The Court recognized that
the threat of large punitive damage awards could inhibit union decisionmaking and en-
courage unions to "process frivolous claims or resist fair settlement." Id. at 51-52. This ra-
tionale seems equally applicable to compensatory damage awards for simple negligence.
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ertheless intentional. A key consideration may have been the need
to assure relief to an employee who can demonstrate that his union
had intentionally caused his grievance to fail yet cannot prove that
the act arose from animus directed personally against him. It is
significant that, rather than addressing the issue of negligence, the
Court linked arbitrariness closely with discrimination and bad
faith, terms that call for some manner of purposeful anti-grievant
design.-"
"Arbitrariness" and "Negligence"
Despite the internal logic of the "intentional harm" cases, sub-
stantial momentum has grown behind a line of decisions finding
arbitrariness even where the union has not acted consciously to de-
prive an employee of the opportunity for redress. In one of the
first cases employing this approach, Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato
de Trabajadores Packinghouse,59 employees claimed that they had
been laid off in breach of their contract and that the union's refusal
to take their claim through the grievance process constituted a
breach of duty." The union defended its position by relying on a
previously commenced NLRB proceeding challenging the employer
action which resulted in the dismissals. Affirming a verdict for the
plaintiffs, the first circuit held that the union should have known
that the NLRB action would not protect the claimants' rights, and
would have known this had the grievance been given more than
"arbitrary and perfunctory"" treatment. No bad faith, hostility, or
intent to thwart the grievants' efforts was found; rather, the
union's "inexplicable" error provided the basis of liability.6 2
A possible consequence of the Figueroa de Arroyo approach is
increased judicial willingness to screen union conduct for due care
and reasonableness even where the task is the delicate one of de-
ciding whether to pursue a contract grievance. Whereas the con-
scious harm standard assesses the union's attitude toward the indi-
vidual employee and scrutinizes the union's actions for
implications of an intent to undermine the grievance, the first cir-
cuit's due care analysis evaluates the representation actually ren-
dered and searches for the level of negligence that, in the court's
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1967).
LI 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
425 F.2d at 283-84.
" Id. at 285.
"Id. at 284.
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view, constitutes arbitrary or perfunctory handling of a grievance.
A similar approach is discernable in Holodnak v. Avco Corp.,63
where the. plaintiff was discharged for violating a shop rule forbid-
ding "false, vicious, or malicious statements" about the firm.64 The
union attorney assigned to represent the plaintiff at the arbitration
hearing made "at best a misguided attempt to plead for mercy from
the arbitrator. 6 5 The attorney did not challenge the validity of the
company rule under the first amendment, and the arbitrator upheld
the discharge.6 The court vacated the arbitration award and granted
the plaintiff damages against both the company and the union,
holding that the failure to challenge the rule rendered the union
representation "perfunctory" and "arbitrary.''67
Holodnak raises the possibility that even where a grievance is
pursued to the arbitration stage, the award may be vacated and
the union held liable if the court determines that the union erred in
its choice of tactics. Such a result would have been unthinkable
under the earlier "conscious harm" view.
The sixth circuit's oft-cited decision in Ruzicka v. General Mo-
tors Corp." has extended union liability for negligent conduct even
further. In Ruzicka, an employee filed a grievance challenging his
discharge for drunkenness and for using abusive language toward
his superiors. 9 The union failed to take timely action required to
invoke arbitration, and the grievance was lost.70 In the discharged
employee's suit against the union and the employer, the district
court held that the union's failure to comply with the requirements
of the grievance process was negligent but was not actionable, be-
cause there was no showing that it was prompted by bad faith.7'
13 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
6, 381 F. Supp. at 194. The plaintiff in Holodnak published an article highly critical of
company and union policies in the newsletter of a radical political group.
Id. at 200.
" Id. at 195-96. Since the employer did a considerable amount of work for the Depart-
ment of Defense, the firing was viewed as "state action," and the court thus scrutinized the
company rule for the first amendment violations. Id. at 202-04.
11 Id. at 200-01. The court may also have been influenced by the impromptu nature of
the union attorney's preparations for the arbitration hearing. Id. at 195-96.
- 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975). See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 720; Dinges,
Ruzicka v. General Motors: An Unlikely Hero of the Trade Union Movement - The Individual
Employee in a Section 301 Case Who Has Been a Victim of Union Negligence, 24 WAYNE L.
REv. 1773 (1978).
66 523 F.2d at 308.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 308-09.
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The court of appeals reversed, finding that the union's conduct was
"a clear example of arbitrary and perfunctory handling of a griev-
ance" and that arbitrary or discriminatory union action "need not
be motivated by bad faith to amount to unfair representation."' Z
The court distinguished the "conscious harm"7 3 approach by ex-
plaining that bad faith is required only when the employee's chal-
lenge relates to the union's decision that his grievance lacks
merit. 4 In Ruzicka, rather than reaching any decision on the sub-
stance of the employee's grievance, the local neglected to follow a
procedural step necessary to resolve it.
The concurring opinion asserted that the union's conduct was
not arbitrary or perfunctory, because these "are adjectives charac-
terizing intentional conduct that is capricious or superficial."7
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the absence of intent, the concur-
rence concluded that the duty of fair representation had been
breached. While not all negligent acts should result in union liabil-
ity, the concurring opinion maintained, a complete failure to fulfill
the prerequisites to arbitration, in addition to the conduct pro-
scribed by Vaca, should constitute a breach.76
Neither the majority nor concurring opinion in Ruzicka ap-
pears to capture the meaning of Vaca. The majority strained to
find support in established precedent for its statement that simple
negligence can constitute a breach of duty. Its argument that the
standard for union conduct becomes more exacting where a hearing
on the merits is lost through neglect is not convincing. To impose
liability on the union for neglect in its ministerial duties will do
little to prevent the wrongful union conduct toward individuals
that the Court in Vaca and Lockridge sought to discourage. The
concurring opinion, on the other hand, although apparently recog-
nizing that the Supreme Court aimed primarily at culpable, "in-
tentional" conduct, consciously disregarded this mandate in an at-
tempt to create a completely new class of breach. A more rational
course would have been to preserve, in its original form, the Su-
preme Court's requirement of intent, and submit the case to the
trier of fact for a finding whether the union intentionally had ig-
nored its obligation to represent in good faith.
Id. at 310.
Id.; see notes 42-58 and accompanying text supra.
7 523 F.2d at 310. See generally Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971).
' 523 F.2d at 315 (McCree, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
7 Id. at 316 (McCree, J., concurring).
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Several recent cases have continued the trend towards negli-
gence liability. The Ruzicka holding that negligence in failing to
meet procedural deadlines constitutes breaches of the duty, has been
adhered to on several occasions.77 Recent decisions have also found
breach in cases where unions failed to exercise due care in presenting
a grievance to an adjustment committee78 and in keeping the
grievant informed of the progress of his claim." Moreover, an
expanded willingness has been shown to scrutinize the
reasonableness of union decisions on the merits of grievances. In
general, the idea of negligence liability has gained acceptance in a
number of courts, and cases premising union liability on negligence
are no longer the rare exception.
It must be noted, however, that this trend has not proceeded
unopposed. A guiding principle for many courts remains that no
breach of duty will be found if any contract interpretation or any
organizational consideration can be found to support the chal-
lenged union act.8' Additionally, some courts remain faithful to the
7 E.g., Foust v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). In that case, the tenth circuit found
breach of duty where the negligence involved was even less egregious than in Ruzicka. In
Foust, the employee presented his grievance to the union 4 days before the applicable dead-
line, which the union then missed by 2 days. The court, noting several dilatory aspects of the
union's internal procedures, held that the jury could properly treat this conduct as arbitrary.
573 F.2d at 715-16.
7s E.g., Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.
1978). In Milstead, the union representative assigned to prosecute the claim was apparently
unfamiliar with the controlling agreement with management. The court found that the
union's "ineptness" in presenting the merits at a first-stage conference breached its duty of
fair representation. Id. at 234-36.
' E.g., Robesky v. Quantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978). In
Robesky, the plaintiff employee rejected the employer's settlement offer after the union had
failed to notify her that a decision had been made not to arbitrate her wrongful discharge
grievance. The court found that the duty of representation would have been breached even if
the failure to notify her of the decision was the result of negligence, for the union's conduct
was "egregious" and showed "reckless disregard" for the grievant's interest. Id. at 1089-90.
"o E.g., Smith v. Hussmann Refrigeration Co., 103 L.R.R.M. 2321 (8th Cir. 1980). Smith
involved union adherence to the principle of seniority in the processing of grievances. The
court held that the union had breached its duty of fair representation by deciding to accept
the claims of senior employees aggrieved by promotions given to more junior workers on the
basis of their "skill and ability." The court would require unions to base any such decision
to support one group of employees at the expense of another on "an informed, reasoned
judgment regarding their merits of the claims in terms of the language of the collective bar-
gaining agreement." See generally Summers, The Individual'Employee's Rights Under the
Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251
(1977).
31 For cases relying on contract interpretation, see Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555
F.2d 753, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1977); Bernard v. McLean Trucking Co., 429 F. Supp. 284, 287 (D.
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requirement of intent as created by earlier cases.12
Potential Impact of the Negligence Standard
The Vaca Court intended to preserve and strengthen labor ar-
bitration. It has been suggested that, by regulating union conduct,
Vaca "wished to prevent the most patent injustices from being
shielded from judicial intervention without altering the basic sys-
tem."' It is submitted that the inevitable result of the use of a
negligence standard would be to threaten the viability of the arbi-
tral system by opening union activity in the grievance process to
full judicial review. Such scrutiny of union conduct might also con-
flict with the long-standing federal policy of non-intervention in in-
ternal union affairs." While the negligence cases recognize that
Vaca was a step forward since it eliminated the requirement that a
specific hostile motive be proven,85 they seem to overlook the Su-
Kans. 1977); Porter v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 711, 719 (N.D. Ala. 1976), modified sub noma.
Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1979); Patterson v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 405 F. Supp. 980, 986-87 (S.D. Ill. 1976); notes 100 & 103 infra. In Ethier v. United
States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979) the eighth
circuit, on facts strongly resembling those of Ruzicka, characterized the union's failure to
meet a filing deadline as an understandable error in interpreting the grievance provisions of
the contract rather than as arbitrary conduct. Id. at 736. For cases relying on organizational
and pragmatic considerations, such as lack of time or funds, see Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401
F. Supp. 678, 680-81 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Cottrell v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 321 F. Supp. 1401,
1407 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Encina v. Tony Lama Co., 316 F. Supp. 239, 245 (W.D. Tex. 1970),
aff'd, 448 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1971).
x2 See Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1975);
Kowalski v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 433 F. Supp. 314, 316-17 (N.D. Ill.
1977). Cannon is an excellent example of the intent requirement in operation. The plaintiff,
a truckadriver, was involved in an accident and refused to submit to a sobriety test at the
time he reported the mishap to the company's local terminal. 524 F.2d at 292. After being
discharged, the employee filed a grievance claiming that he was unaware of the conse-
quences of refusing to take the test and that the rule requiring him to do so was not properly
promulgated. Id. The union representative at the first-stage hearing pleaded plaintiff's good
record and asserted the unlikelihood of plaintiff being intoxicated at 11:00 A.M. when the
accident occurred. Id. at 293-94. The district court held that the union had breached its duty
by not challenging the validity of the rule requiring the sobriety test. Id. at 293. Reversing,
the seventh circuit held that "[t]o prove arbitrary or discriminatory treatment, the plaintiff
must show that the Union's conduct was intentional, invidious and directed at that particu-
lar employee." Id. at 293; accord, Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 101 L.R.R.M. 2059,
2062 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M. 2663, 2670-71 (W.D. Mich. 1978);
see Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.
1979), discussed in Baer, supra note 33, at 28, col. 3.
" Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M. 2663, 2671 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
" See, e.g., Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Newman v. Local
1101, Communication Workers, 570 F.2d 439, 446 (2d Cir. 1978).
11 Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers, 501 F.2d 258, 264 (9th Cir. 1974).
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preme Court's indications that the duty of fair representation was
developed primarily to prevent disparate treatment of unit employ-
ees and intentional union wrongdoing.86
Nor does the nature of the union-employee relationship lend
itself to due care scrutiny. The union is the statutory agent not of
the individual but of the entire bargaining unit;" its responsibility
is to exercise good faith in representing the unit as a whole. Recog-
nizing the collective nature of this obligation, the Vaca Court ruled
that the union should have wide discretion in administering the
grievance process, subject only to no individual being singled out
for unfavorable treatment. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never
gone so far as to hold that a union has a duty to use due care with
respect to individual grievances. Unlike the traditional agent-prin-
cipal or professional-client relationships, the union-employee bond
is unique in that it should not entitle the employee to expect any
particular level of skill from his union. For example, were a union
to negotiate a contract calling for a wage settlement lower than
that which could have been obtained had the union officials been
more adamant or resourceful, no one would suggest that individual
employees could maintain an action for a money judgment. The
dependent nature of the union's ability to represent its constituents
vigorously is another unique factor. The union necessarily must
rely on its money and manpower, but these resources vary widely
among unions and invariably are scarcest during a union's forma-
tive stages when employee expectations are at their highest. A
union's strength also varies with the depth of the support it re-
ceives from the workers themselves. Whereas the agent in a tradi-
tional fiduciary relationship may call upon the full cooperation of
his principal, this support cannot be compelled under the National
Labor Relations Act. 89
Moreover, it is important to consider the impact of negligence
81 Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971); Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964).
'1 NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); see Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-
50 (1964); Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928
(1969).
See 386 U.S. at 191, 194.
89 NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Among other rights, § 7 guarantees that employees
shall have "the right to refrain from any or all [concerted] activities." Id. Additionally,
NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976), makes it unlawful for a union to coerce
an employee in the exercise of his § 7 rights, and NLRA § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)
(1976), similarly makes it unlawful for the union to cause the company to discriminate
against non-union workers.
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liability on the union's ability to give the desired fair representa-
tion in arbitration proceedings. The practical effect of large dam-
age awards will be to make it more, not less, difficult for unions to
represent all grievants fairly. Where a union is negligent, it is sub-
mitted that a more fruitful remedy for all concerned would be a
resort by the employees to NLRB election procedures with the aim
of securing a more responsible bargaining agent. This remedy, of
course, may not be completely satisfactory from the point of view
of the individual grievant harmed by union negligence. Neverthe-
less, the aggrieved individual often will be able to take advantage
of intra-union corrective remedies set forth in the labor organiza-
tion's constitution or by-laws." Nor should it be forgotten that a
majority of unit employees normally have assented to a contractual
provision giving their union exclusive, discretionary control over
the grievance process;" perhaps it may be said that the employees
have effectively waived any future claims of negligence. In carrying
out their role in the grievance process, union officers must screen
out frivolous claims, familiarize themselves with the merits of nu-
merous cases, and allocate their resources to the considerable min-
isterial tasks involved, always keeping in mind the interests of the
unit as a whole. Errors in this process are unavoidable, and it does
not appear to be unreasonable to impute knowledge of this fact to
the employees who have placed their grievances in their union's
hands. Basing union liability on negligence in research or prepara-
tion is particularly disturbing, since it is unavoidable that fledgling
union locals or unions undergoing financial difficulties or internal
strife may not have the resources or personnel to avoid such errors
even when acting in the best of faith.
Finally, it is conceivable that a wave of negligence cases will
require unions to foolproof their internal procedures, formalize rela-
11 Where the union is negligent and the unfair representation plaintiff has alleged no
union animus against him, there would seem to be no reason to believe that the union would
deny him a private remedy. The intra-union remedies offered by larger unions can often
make the claimant whole. See Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1275 (7th Cir.
1977).
11 Under NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), each employee has the right to pre-
sent grievances directly to the employer without the intervention of the union, provided the
presentation does not conflict with any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Where the agreement states that grievances must be forwarded through the union, therefore,
this exclusivity provision is enforceable against every person in the unit. See Black-Clawson
Co. v. Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); Woody v. Sterling Aluminum
Prods., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Mo. 1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).
19801
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:357
tions with individual grievants, and use any and all conceivable
theories to support a claim in order to avoid liability. It is easy to
imagine that the end product of this process would be a movement
away from the use of arbitration by unions-a result contrary to
established congressional and judicial policy2 2 Thus, it is submit-
ted that the most important factor for courts to consider in future
fair representation cases is the potential impact upon the viability
of labor arbitration, and that if this approach is adopted, the tide
towards negligence liability will be stemmed.
THE SUBSTANTIVE DUTY-ITS CURRENT STATUS
The severity with which the duty of fair representation will be
applied to a particular claim of breach is dependent upon a num-
ber of factors, including the jurisdiction in which the action is
brought.13 Notwithstanding attitudinal differences among the cir-
cuits, however, certain general principles can be gleaned from the
fair representation standards currently applied. An important con-
sideration in discerning these principles is that the standards vary
according to the stage of the grievance procedure in which the chal-
lenged activity occurred."
12 See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
" Compare Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) with Ethier
v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979). See
generally Dinges, supra note 68, at 1781-82. One of the courts which has afforded unions a
broad range of discretion is the second circuit. The court has been particularly reluctant to
disturb settlements reached by the union and employer. See Suissa v. American Export
Lines, Inc., 507 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974); Simberlund v. Long Island R.R., 421 F.2d 1219 (2d
Cir. 1970); Pyzynski v. New York Cent. R.R., 421 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970). While it is true
that the court has held that "bad faith" is not an essential element of the breach of duty
action, see Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451,
456 (2d Cir. 1979); Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974), the
court seems to give the union the benefit of the doubt when reviewing a union decision not to
arbitrate a particular grievance, see, e.g., Bartles v. New York Lithographers' Union No. One-
P, 431 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam). But see Steinman v. Spector Freight System,
Inc., 441 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1971). Recently, in a case that arose outside the grievance process,
the second circuit showed a strong policy favoring union discretion where the challenged
activity concerned seniority adjustments following a merger of two businesses. See Ryan v.
New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979).
" See notes 95-119 infra. The standards applied by the courts generally become stricter
as the grievance machinery proceeds. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that
as the union becomes progressively more familiar with the facts of a particular case and the
employer's attitude towards the claim, a higher standard of conduct is required. It is sub-
mitted, however, that if the union is motivated by bad faith or discrimination or has decided
arbitrarily to work against the grievant, this is more likely to manifest itself early in the
grievance process. In addition, where good faith is demonstrated by accepting the claim for
processing and by embarking upon the delicate task of presenting it for adjustment, the
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The union's duty at the investigative stage has not been inter-
preted stringently. 5 In view of the volume of employee claims and
the time-consuming nature of investigatory activity, the union
must necessarily have wide discretion in this area in order to con-
serve its resources. While an unreasoned refusal to investigate will
amount to "arbitrariness,"96 the reported cases nevertheless set a
fairly generous standard for the union. One court, for example, re-
cently found no breach of duty where the investigation conducted
by the union amounted to only brief conversations with the griev-
ant and one employer representative." Similarly, the failure to in-
terview witnesses, even important ones, will not always constitute a
breach."
The union's preliminary judgment concerning the merits of a
grievance, like the investigation preceding it, generally has been
treated fairly liberally by the courts.9 For the most part, the
union's decisions will be upheld if supported either by a rational
reading of the collective bargaining agreement"" or by the union's
practical need to limit the number of grievances prosecuted. 10' In-
deed, it has been held that in determining whether to process a
grievance, the union is entitled to consider whether the claim will
justify the time and expense involved.1 2 Moreover, there seems to
union seems more, not less, entitled to wide discretion.
11 See Franklin v. Crosby Typesetting Co., 411 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (N.D. Tex. 1976),
aff'd, 568 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1978); Mangiaguerra v. D & L Transport, Inc., 410 F. Supp.
1022 (N.D. ll. 1976); Theoretical Structure, supra note 2, at 1161-67.
11 See, e.g., Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
,7 Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M. 2663, 2667 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
" See, e.g., Franklin v. Crosby Typesetting Co., 411 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Tex. 1976),
aff'd, 568 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1978); Mangiaguerra v. D & L Transport, Inc., 410 F. Supp.
1022 (N.D. Ill. 1976). But see Hines v. Local 377, Chauffeurs, 506 F.2d 1153, 1156 (6th Cir.
1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hines i,. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554
(1976).
" But see Figueroa De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
- See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1977);
Hayden v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. Cal. 1978); La
China v. Dana Corp., 433 F. Supp. 430, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Dishman v. Crain Bros., Inc.,
415 F. Supp. 277, 282 (W.D. Pa. 1976). But see Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191
(D. Conn. 1974), modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 892 (1975); Smith v. Hussmann Refrig. Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 2238 (8th Cir. 1979).
"I' See Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 678, 680-81 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Cottrell v.
Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 321 F. Supp. 1401, 1407 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Encina v. Tony Lama Co., 316
F. Supp. 239, 245 (W.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1971).
,o2 Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972); see Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons,
Inc., 607 F.2d 138, 145 (5th Cir. 1979); Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 678, 680-81
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exist something in the nature of a presumption that a union's find-
ings on the merits of a claim will be based on a good faith view of
the situation and the labor contract.03 It is submitted, therefore,
that despite the Vaca Court's statement that "a union must, in
good faith and in a nonarbitrary manner, make decisions as to the
merits of particular grievances,"'' an unfair representation plain-
tiff whose grievance has not been accepted by his union will be
forced to rely on a "bad faith" or "discrimination" theory, with all
the concomitant problems of proof. Only if the union refuses to
process the claim without evaluating its worth will a plaintiff be
likely to succeed on the basis of "arbitrariness."
Once the union decides that the grievance is meritorious, it
will be held to stricter standards throughout the remainder of the
process. For example, although the circuits differ,' there is a
marked trend towards finding arbitrariness from an unexplained
failure to file a grievance timely.106 Similarly, the union's presenta-
(E.D. Mich. 1975).
"I In Savel v. Detroit News, 435 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Mich. 1977), officials of the union
determined, after investigation, that the employee's grievance was unfounded. The court,
once satisfied that the union had reached the merits of the claim, found that the duty of
representation was not breached, without giving significant consideration to the substantive
accuracy of the union's decision. Id. at 334-35;,accord, Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M.
2663, 2669 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Manica v. Chrysler Corp., 97 L.R.R.M. 2679, 2685 (E.D.
Mich. 1978). The Barhitte court would allow a union decision to stand unless tainted by
"extreme neglect or intentional disregard" of the facts, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2669, whereas
Manica would require the application of "objective and rational criteria," 97 L.R.R.M. at
2685. See Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 454 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1978);
Grant v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. 2686 (D. Kans. 1978).
The presumption that the union has properly decided the merits of the grievance will
exist even where the issues are not normally thought of as being within its knowledge and
expertise, such as constitutional questions. See Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d
753, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1977). The union's decision also will enjoy a presumption of propriety
even where it is based on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement that
originated with the employer. La China v. Dana Corp., 433 F. Supp. 430, 434-35, 437-38
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
A factor supporting the presumption in favor of the union's decision on the merits is
that the union is in a better position than the employee to know the controlling agreement
and law. See, e.g., Hayden v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 396, 398-99
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Dishman v. Crain Bros., Inc., 415 F. Supp. 277, 280 (W.D. Pa. 1976). See
also Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1221 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
516 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 319 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Mich.
1970).
10, Vaca, 386 U.S. at 194.
105 Compare Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) with Ethier
v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979).
"' See, e.g., Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich.
1976).
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
tion of the merits before the grievance committees, and eventually
before the arbitrator, is regulated closely. The union is required to
be adequately familiar with relevant contract provisions, 07 and
breach of duty may be found where the union fails to capitalize,
even through neglect, on a possible theory of recovery for the griev-
ant.10 Furthermore, while the union is given discretion on such
questions as whether to allow the admission of hearsay evidence,'
to pursue a group grievance individually or in one proceeding," 0 or
to demand a single arbitrator as opposed to a panel,"' the union
will be liable for breach if its decision was made in disregard of the
employee's best interests."2 One limitation on judicial regulation of
the union's presentation of the merits, however, is that no breach
of duty will be found where the grievant himself had an opportu-
nity to remedy the defects in the presentation but failed to do so."3
Another means by which a union can breach the duty of fair
representation is through its failure to inform the individual of the
progress of his claim. Notwithstanding the considerable amount of
judicial resistance to this theory of liability,"' recent cases demon-
strate that this type of breach is likely to become more important
in the future."5
Breach of duty liability also may be based upon an unfair set-
tlement or abandonment of a grievance."6 The most common diffi-
'o' See Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.
1978); note 78 and accompanying text supra.
"I See Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), modified on other
grounds, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975). Generally, if the union
accepts a grievance, it cannot argue against granting relief. See Kesner v. NLRB, 532 F.2d
1169, 1175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983 (1976). But see King v. Space Carriers, Inc.,
608 F.2d 283, 288 (8th Cir. 1979).
" See Bell v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1975). Arbitrators
are generally not bound by the legal rules of evidence. See AmmcAN ARBrRATION ASS'N,
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBrrRATIoN RuLs § 28 (1958).
"I See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Additional Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50, 65-70 (1975).
M' See Marietta v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 414 F. Supp. 1029, 1037 (D.N.J. 1976). See also
Ness v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 101 L.R.R.M. 2621 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
112 Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972).
"' See, e.g., Davis v. Ameripol, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 284, 286 n.6 (E.D. Tex. 1972). See also
Siskey v. General Teamsters Local 261, 419 F. Supp. 48, 52-53 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
11 See, e.g., Simberlund v. Long Island R.R., 421 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1970); Smith v.
Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 103 L.R.R.M. 2321 (8th Cir. 1980).
1 See Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978); Harri-
son v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 561-62 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 958 (1976).
"I See Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers Union, 585 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978).
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culty in this area concerns disparate settlements of similar claims.
Where. the grievant can show that he received a less generous set-
tlement than a coworker due to discrimination, a breach of duty
will be found." 7 In contrast, the arrangement will be binding on the
grievant if the union, in settling with the employer, is motivated by
rational considerations.' Similarly, should the grievant refuse to
agree- to a permissible settlement, the union may safely discontinue
processing his claim." 9
Finally, there remain some unresolved questions concerning
the mechanics of the employee's breach of duty action, but full
consideration of these questions is beyond the scope of this Note.'
"' See Suissa v. American Export Lines, Inc., 507 F.2d 1343, 1347 (2d Cir. 1974). Settle-
ments disparately treating some employees have been upheld in two cases involving differ-
ences in seniority. See Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1973); McReyn-
olds v. General Elec. Co., 406 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D. Ohio 1976). Disparate treatment in this
area would seem a safe practice in view of the importance attached to employee seniority by
most collective bargaining agreements. But cf. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 103
L.R.R.M. 2321 (8th Cir. 1980) (seniority not a permissible "neutral" classification for union
to draw).
118 See McGovern v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 773, 447 F. Supp. 368 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1978).
"I Local 1902, Bhd. of Ry. Airline & S.S. Clerks v. Safety Cabs, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 64,
66 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
12 Determining the proper statute of limitations is one unsettled area. State law
controls on federally created causes of action where Congress has not supplied a limitations
period of its own. See, e.g., Campbell v. Haverhille, 155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895), the statute of
limitations to be applied to the breach of contract action against the employer will be read-
ily ascertainable in most jurisdictions, see, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 213(2) (McKinney
1972 & Supp. 1978-1979). Which state limitations period, however, may be unclear in many
states. Some courts apply state tort statutes, apparently on the theory that the union's lia-
bility results essentially from its intentionally tortious act or failure to meet a standard of
due care like that used in personal injury and property damage suits. See, e.g., Smart v.
Ellis Trucking Co., 580 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1978); Daniels v. Steamfitters Local 342, 95
L.R.R.M. 3290, 3291 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 418 F.
Supp. 1058, 1059 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd, 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1978). Other courts, empha-
sizing the impliedly contractual nature of the union-employee relation, apply state contract
limitations periods. See, e.g., Warren v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 337
(8th Cir. 1976); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1009 (1971). Still others use statutes of limitations applicable to "statutory causes of ac-
tion." See, e.g., Heritage v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 447 F. Supp. 1240, 1243-44 (D. Del.
1978); Devries v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 91 L.R.R.M. 2764, 2767 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
Controversy also surrounds the duty of an aggrieved employee to exhaust any internal
procedures established by the union for possible restitution of wronged members. See Mills
v. Long Island R.R., 515 F.2d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 1975); Larimer v. United Inter-Mountain Tel.
Co., 428 F. Supp. 8, 10-11 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). It must be noted, however, that numerous
exceptions to this rule have been recognized. See, e.g., Farmer v. Local 1064, United Ca-
tering Workers, 99 L.R.R.M. 2166, 2185 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (workers prevented from ob-
taining copy of union constitution explaining remedies); Patterson v. Bialystoker & Bikur
Cholim, Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. 3115, 3116 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no reasonable chance of relief); Mar-
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CONCLUSION
In applying the duty of fair representation to the union's han-
dling of grievances, the courts have been faced with the task of
balancing the discretion necessary for effective union action against
the need to protect the individual from abuse of exclusive agency
power. A logical reconciliation of these conflicting considerations
would be to impose liability only for intentional union conduct that
wrongfully retards the progress of a grievance. This view comports
with the standard established by the Supreme Court's seminal
opinion in Vaca v. Sipes. Nevertheless, the lower courts continue to
disagree on the scope of the duty of fair representation. A more
definitive exposition of the law on this subject is thus necessary if
the union, employer, and individual grievant are to know the full
extent of their rights and obligations in grievance arbitration.
Alan Sorkowitz
tino v. Transport Workers Local 234, 99 L.R.R.M. 3074, 3075 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1978) (exhaustion
would be futile).
Finally, another disputed question is whether attorney's fees are recoverable. Such
awards are improper according to the general rule. See Cronin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 445
F. Supp. 277, 278 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 588 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1978).
However, fees incurred by the individual employee may be collectible from the union pro-
vided the employee can prove bad faith conduct by the union. See Richardson v. Communi-
cations Workers, 530 F.2d 126, 132 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); Negri v.
Service Employees Local 87, 98 L.R.R.M. 2508 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Where there is no bad
faith, an award of attorney's fees would seem to be barred by Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), wherein the Court held that attorney's fees may be
awarded without statutory authorization only in extremely limited circumstances.
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